Defence and security have become the headline growth story for Earth observation. PwC, citing Novaspace, estimates that defence and security applications generated almost half of EO satellite revenue in 2024 and forecasts 54% of total EO revenue across 2025–2034. The estimate shows the scale of demand, but not how revenue will be distributed across sensors, analytics, buyers and procurement routes. Defence is not a new use of space. Space has historically been dual use, and military requirements have helped drive technological development – including improvements in the spatial and temporal resolution of Earth-observation systems.
What has changed is the breadth of the security question. Climate change has not stopped while armed conflicts persist in several theatres; conflict itself adds to the climate burden. Current conflicts also affect food and energy supply, shipping, land and water, extending the security picture beyond the traditional uses of EO – intelligence on an adversary, border surveillance and battlefield monitoring. The same data can inform a wider security assessment.
The Initiative on GHG Accounting of War estimates that Russia’s war on Ukraine generated 311.4 million tonnes of CO₂ equivalent in its first four years – a cumulative total the report compares with France’s annual emissions.
When Conflict Reaches the Harvest
A Joint Research Centre study uses Sentinel-1 and Sentinel-2 to map war-induced changes in agricultural land use in Ukraine. A separate example shows the same monitoring need continuing under wartime conditions. In November 2025, France approved a €480,000 FASEP grant to GEOSYS, the French company acquired by EarthDaily, for in-season crop-area estimates and yield trends for Ukraine’s agriculture ministry, then part of the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture. The project aims to strengthen agricultural monitoring and decision-making during disruption to food production.
These are agricultural services, not military products. Their security relevance comes from the decision at stake: where conflict and climate pressure threaten food supply, crop-area and yield data can inform a food-security assessment. The use case persists; the wartime context gives it an additional security meaning. FASEP is a public-sector grant route for a demonstrator, not evidence of defence procurement.
When Security Reaches the Sea
UKMTO has reported multiple attacks on tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz, including crude-oil tankers. The IMO’s highlighted incident list covers confirmed incidents in the Strait of Hormuz and the Middle East. It recorded 120 confirmed incidents and 24 seafarer fatalities as at 22 October 2026. That is a regional total, not a count for the Strait alone. The tracker records individual pollution incidents in and around the Strait, including limited pollution reported within it and an oil leak under assessment near Khasab. The Commission’s Delegated Directive (EU) 2025/811 identifies increased oil transport by unsafe and uninsured shadow-fleet vessels as a risk to maritime safety and the environment.
Copernicus Maritime Surveillance, operated by the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), provides imagery and value-added products for maritime safety and security, law enforcement and pollution monitoring. It combines satellite data with vessel identity and position information, behaviour analysis and other sources. The work may use SAR or optical imagery, depending on the task. It shows why the market cannot be reduced to imagery at the highest spatial resolution: different sensors and analytics contribute to the operational picture.
A Civilian Product, a Public Buyer
European procurement records show different institutions buying or seeking Earth-observation capability for different tasks. Finland’s Ministry of Defence signed a contract with ICEYE for a SAR satellite system.
In 2023, EMSA awarded Airbus and European Space Imaging a 24-month framework contract for very-high-resolution optical imagery, with two optional 12-month renewals. In 2024, SatCen renewed SESA geospatial-products supply through an e-GEOS-led consortium of Airbus, CLS, GMV, IABG and Telespazio for up to three years, following similar two-year service contracts in 2017 and 2019.
The 2026 notices cover a new SatCen tender for SESA geospatial products, the EMSA tender for satellite images and value-added maritime products, and DG AGRI’s civilian MARSOP7 tender for crop monitoring and yield forecasting. These are tender notices, not completed awards. Whether the new SESA or EMSA tender continues the earlier arrangements is not public.
Together, the awards and tenders show commercial EO suppliers serving or being sought by public buyers across defence, security, maritime and agricultural channels. For founders, the distinction matters: the security question may be wider than the defence procurement market.
They do not show a defence ministry buying drought monitoring. That remains a proposition to test with buyers and procurement records.
Who Buys the Data – and Who Can Access It?
Security relevance starts with the decision the data supports. Crop monitoring may inform a security assessment when conflict or drought puts food supply at risk. Procurement follows the institution responsible for that decision. A ministry of defence, maritime agency, security service or civilian directorate may buy the capability. The procurement record – not the use case alone – shows which route the buyer uses.
In April 2026, Bloomberg reported that, after a US government request, Planet Labs moved from delaying imagery of Iran and the wider Middle East to restricting access to it. Privateer Space and Kayrros reported disruption to their own commercial monitoring. The episode shows that access controls can change what customers receive even when the imagery itself has not changed.
Access is a product condition as well as a technical one. Fit depends on the decision and collection requirements – revisit rate, latency, coverage, SAR or optical imagery, analytics, and who can restrict access and under what conditions.
For founders, the practical implication is that a civilian product can have a defence buyer. The use case and the budget line are separate questions: what problem can the data solve, and which institution funds that requirement? The test is whether the product meets that requirement under the necessary access and performance conditions, and whether a procurement route exists to fund it.