Infrastructure Resilience


+3%: The Cost of Resilience
That Never Gets Built In



7 April 2026 | Perspective

Infrastructure projects in emerging markets are routinely underprotected against natural hazards. Not because nobody knows the risk, but because knowing the risk and acting on it are separated by a structural gap that the industry rarely talks about openly.

According to UNDRR, integrating resilience from the start adds approximately 3% to the total project cost. The cost of not doing it runs to multiples of the original investment.

Why the +3% argument doesn’t work in practice

The gap between what standards require and what gets built is not a knowledge problem. Most project teams working in geohazard-exposed terrain are aware of the risk. The problem sits in the decision-making structure around them.

Standards typically require that adequate measures be taken against natural hazards, with engineering calculations to back them up. In practice, a lack of specialist knowledge – among designers, clients, and sometimes the controlling experts – leads to one of two outcomes: a default to familiar traditional solutions that may not actually address the hazard, or a quiet omission of the problem altogether. In the latter case, no single party is accountable if a disaster occurs.

When newer, more effective approaches are available – and in many cases permitted even under outdated guidelines – implementing them requires extra effort from all parties and carries higher professional responsibility, without corresponding financial incentives. This is similar to the premium problem for green solutions: the barrier is not technical, it is systemic. Reducing it requires regulatory reform that increases incentives and distributes risk more fairly across designers, experts, contractors, and the government authorities responsible for budget allocation.

Where resilience is actually decided

The +3% figure only holds when resilience is integrated at the design stage. By the time a project reaches construction, options narrow and costs rise sharply.

The critical window opens earlier than most clients realise: at the pre-survey stage. Risks that are not identified before surveys are commissioned cannot be included in the survey scope. What is not in the survey cannot be designed for. Many countries have introduced risk maps specifically to address this – regulations in these systems require cross-referencing with hazard maps for any construction project. The tools exist. The discipline to use them early enough is what is often missing.

What good looks like

China’s Sichuan province offers one of the clearest examples of what a genuine shift in approach produces. After the devastating 2008 earthquake, the government introduced a programme to protect both existing and newly built infrastructure against natural hazards – landslides, rockfalls, debris flows. Local design and construction norms were updated based on best practices from Alpine-region countries. Significant annual budgets were allocated to hazard assessment and protection systems.

The hazards themselves were not new. What changed was the institutional mindset: resilient infrastructure moved from ‘good to have one day’ to ‘must have here and now.’ That shift – not the technology, not the budget alone – is what made the difference.

The practical question

For infrastructure developers, project managers, and funding institutions working in geohazard-exposed terrain: the relevant question is not whether to invest in resilience. It is whether risks are identified at the survey stage and properly addressed at the design stage. If they are, the extra investment stays close to that 3% figure. If they are not, the cost of the problem – financial, ecological, human – is paid later, at a much higher price.
Dr. Alexander Barinov | Founder & CEO of BAA International, specialising in geotechnical engineering and natural hazard risk management.